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LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Rogers M. 
Smith. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1985. Pp. 307. 
$22.50. 
Liberalism and American Constitutional Law inquires into the na-
ture of the nation's public philosophy. It focuses upon the role of lib-
eralism both in animating the nation's political spirit and in fulfilling 
the political and philosophical needs of society. The forum for the 
author's discussion is that of constitutional law. Here, Rogers M. 
Smith 1 depicts the unworking of liberalism's grasp on constitutional 
decisionmaking, a grip loosened by the interjection of rival ideologies 
at various historical junctures. Critical of these departures from our 
liberal heritage, Smith discusses the potential for a revival of liberal 
principles as a foundation on which to base future constitutional 
decisions. 
The author begins with the observation that "America's original 
liberalism has proven a restless corpse" (p. 2). The point is not that 
classical liberalism is dead, though some might argue that it is. Nor is 
the point that liberalism is a dead hand influencing constitutional in-
terpretations, even though the Constitution itself is certainly a liberal 
document. Instead, Smith's analogy is intended to illustrate a 
profound disturbance in our nation's political and philosophical sub-
strata. Liberalism, which once animated America's political and con-
stitutional activities, is no longer the popular ethic or the single 
"settled" force behind constitutional determinations that it formerly 
was. 
Smith reasons that liberalism's decline has left us without a compa-
rable comprehensive philosophy of sufficient scope and power to shape 
the public laws. And although the framers' liberal ideas concerning 
limited government, separation of powers, and individual liberty re- · 
main embodied in the Constitution, the liberal philosophy that led 
them to adopt these provisions is not the articulated public philosophy 
of today. Consequently, when faced with a decision, modern deci-
sionmakers lack a body of accepted principle on which to draw when 
they deliberate on any particular problem. Smith argues that the lack 
of an underlying body of settled principles translates into arbitrary 
constitutional adjudication. He observes that judges and justices have 
"moved in directions explored by influential political theorists" (p. 
63), so that decisions have been based on prevailing political theories 
acceptable to the judicial decisionmakers themselves rather than on 
any accepted fundamental set of principles. 
Smith contends that the Constitution is best interpreted through 
1. Associate Professor of Political Science, ,Yale University. 
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the liberal perspective that gave rise to its creation. For Smith, these 
basic ideas should be settled, and should not be thrown aside at the 
constitutional level simply because the prevailing political winds sug-
gest that a rival political position has gained some advantage on any 
particular point. To this end, Smith presents an intelligent articula-
tion and refinement of liberal principles which are, he argues, well-
suited to solving modem problems in governance and law. 
Smith's concern is not that modem Supreme Court Justices have 
embellished constitutional doctrine, but that they cannot agree on fun-
damental principles of interpretation. He analyzes four important 
constitutional areas (due process, freedom of speech, voting apportion-
ment, and economic welfare rights) to illustrate his point. As an ex-
ample, Smith points out numerous inconsistencies in the development 
of first amendment doctrines. For example, he notes that the Court 
has, over the years, adopted positions on the degree of protection ac-
corded different types of speech only to abandon those positions in 
later terms, sometimes incorporating elements of past positions, some-
times wholly abandoning positions once rigorously defended. Smith 
concludes that "because the resulting case law displays so many nor-
mative perspectives, free speech doctrine is now widely perceived as 
internally confused and substantively inadequate" (p. 119). 
In Smith's view, the proper response to this doctrinal confusion is 
not to abandon the original value-structure underlying the first 
amendment in favor of some novel realignment of society and govern-
ment, but to reexamine the values that undergird our present system 
of government. Smith says that "[s]ince the law only reflects the 
broader uncertainties in contemporary American thought about the 
purposes of free speech and of the constitutional system as a whole, it 
is unlikely that the inconsistencies in current First Amendment doc-
trines can be reduced unless the difficulties of early liberal aims and 
later goals are addressed in a stronger guiding theory" (p. 119). Such 
a guiding theory, Smith argues, must include the substantive concerns 
of the drafters of the first amendment, modified as necessary to be 
responsive to the problems of modern society. The conflicts involved 
in first amendment adjudication - for example, the conflict between 
freedom of expression and regulation ostensibly enacted to promote 
common interests - can best be resolved through the application of 
liberal principles, because these principles gave rise to the first amend-
ment in response to this conflict in the first place. 
Smith does not address the task of rewriting first amendment law 
by identifying specific rules of decision. Rather, he seeks to articulate 
the facet of liberal belief that holds the key to accomplishing the task. 
Facing the general criticism that liberalism lacks a comprehensive, co-
herent philosophical underpinning, Smith responds: · 
The seminal philosophic work of early liberalism, Locke's Essay, sJg-
gests the purpose that has always been the deepest concern of liberal 
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thought, the promotion of personal capacities for reflective self-direc-
tion, or in a word, liberty. A liberalism dedicated to the realization of 
this value by all can provide practical guidance for the problems that 
perplex contemporary constitutional law. [p. 171] 
Smith refines the individualistic liberal concept of rational liberty, or 
the right to engage in rational self-direction in the endeavors of life, 
into a term of art. The fundamental meaning, however, is that an indi-
vidual is free to do whatever he or she wants, as long as it meets a 
minimal standard of rationality. 
This "minimal rationality" standard - as long as it is truly mini-
mal and not, therefore, overly burdensome on individuality - defines 
the proper limit of regulatory oversight where communal values are 
allowed to intrude upon individual autonomy. In Smith's view, this 
standard must be found in "our personal experience of our selves as 
conscious, self-directing beings ... as perceived and expounded by the 
community at large. Thus, political institutions should, through dem-
ocratic processes, elicit and enforce prevailing social standards of what 
constitutes minimally rational, deliberative conduct and of what pre-
serves the ability to engage in it" (p. 213). Smith responds to the dan-
ger of "majoritarian intolerance" this approach raises by observing: 
The rational liberty view ... authorizes the liberal political community 
to decide, not what behavior the community finds truly good or ration-
ally correct, but rather what conduct expresses a process of rational de-
liberation and, conversely, what actions endanger persons' continuing 
capacities for rational deliberation. Only the latter can rightfully be pro-
hibited. [p. 213] 
The rational liberty view imposes numerous limits on majority rule in 
favor of minority interests. Clearly, Smith favors these limits, but he 
does not contend that the adoption of his rational liberty view is mor-
ally required, only that it is more desirable than the alternatives: 
Although the rational liberty view cannot show that its values are 
absolutes, it does provide an argument, based on the fundamental char-
acteristics of the human condition as we now experience it, that neither 
happiness nor a sense of moral value can be attained in the long run 
unless we accept the personal responsibilities for systematic reflection 
that the early liberals identified. [p. 220] 
Perhaps the author's most compelling point is that our society has 
inherited liberalism along with our constitutional system, and that ri-
val political and philosophical positions are inherently alien to it. But 
the author does not rest on this point. He endeavors to describe pi:;om-
inent contemporary theories and to point out their inadequacies as po-
tential foundations of a prevailing public philosophy. Summing up his 
critiques of romantic, religious, and egalitarian positions, the author 
states: 
The dedication of democratic relativism to the morality of consent and 
to democratic processes leaves few resources for protection against 
majoritarian abuses, despite the best efforts of its advocates to circum-
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vent this weakness. The higher law tradition lacks intellectual credibility 
and is a proven weapon of intolerance. And neo-Kantian liberalism of-
fers such a shallow and unsupported view of human dignity that it fails 
to capture many deep-rooted American moral sentiments and provides 
little concrete moral reassurance or guidance on worthy courses of con-
duct. [p. 170] 
In their place Smith offers his rational liberty view, historically rooted 
and constitutionally linked. And while the practicality of his ap-
proach is not empirically established, the theory itself provides a 
strong theoretical underpinning for future development. As such it is 
very provocative and interesting, but necessarily incomplete. 
One might ask why liberalism lost its preeminent position as a 
"public philosophy." Perhaps it never really occupied this position. 
Or, perhaps it is a time-bound ideology inadequate to meet present-
day problems. Smith suggests that liberals have avoided the "explicit 
adoption of any substantive purpose" because they have been side-
tracked by more pressing concerns "such as peace, economic growth, 
or greater political and social equality" (p. 201). Liberalism was par-
ticularly susceptible to both political and ideological challenges for 
several reasons. First, Smith points out, the arguments used by early 
liberals to demonstrate the superiority of their ideology, such as ap-
peals to higher law, natural rights, and some amount of rational em-
piricism, were inconsistent and confused (p. 36). Additionally, the 
author notes that substantial inherent conflicts existed between the 
main goals of liberalism - the promotion of civil peace, material pros-
perity through economic growth, scientific progress, and rational lib-
erty (p. 66). It would appear that even early liberals could not agree 
on how to promote one goal without interfering with another. For 
example, liberals have always grappled with the problem of majority 
rule and minority rights. Liberalism recognizes both, yet the two fre-
quently clash. This inability rationally to mediate conflicting priorities 
is one of liberalism's central woes. Smith offers the rational liberty 
view as a solution to this problem, and maybe it is. But, as the author 
concedes, his theory is as yet not fully developed, and remains 
untested. 
One of the virtues of Smith's book is that it is historically sophisti-
cated. Rather than conceive of a wholly original notion of how to 
interpret the Constitution, Smith develops his theory directly from 
traditional liberal doctrine, the source of the Constitution itself. It is 
difficult to think of a more appropriate starting place when considering 
an interpretive model for constitutional decisionmaking. Smith's dis-
cussion of liberal doctrine, however, is complex, and the main thread 
of reasoning in the book is a bit hard to follow. This is true particu-
larly because the author's rational liberty theory is not laid out at the 
beginning, but is delayed until after the basic liberal perspective is 
presented and contrasted with rival political and philosophical ideolo-
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gies. Any confusion this approach engenders, however, does not de-
tract from the book's value, because Smith's discussions of the ideas of 
early liberals and their critics, as well as the fate of the liberal ethic in 
Supreme Court decisions, is as interesting as it is necessary to the de-
velopment of his perspective on rational liberty. 
More difficult, however, is the author's discussion of more recent 
political and philosophical doctrines. A prior acquaintance with the 
work of the modern legal philosophers Smith critiques would be use-
ful. Nevertheless, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law offers 
an excellent theoretical approach to some of liberalism's fundamental 
problems. That it does so in a particularly careful and thoughtful way 
increases the likelihood that it may contribute to a better-articulated 
modern liberal ideology. 
- Eric Brunstad 
